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Abstract 
In this paper, we review selected evidence to demonstrate the value of experiments for policy 
design with a focus on environmental policy and tax policy. Experiments can substantially 
improve ex-ante predictions about the outcomes of policy interventions, for example, by 
serving as “testbeds” to compare alternative market rules and mechanisms under tightly 
controlled conditions. Experiments also yield important insights into systematic deviations 
from strict rationality and into the heterogeneity of preferences among decision-makers that 
can form the basis for the (re-) design of policies. Besides describing various experimental 
approaches applied in the areas of environmental policy and tax policy, we also discuss 
further directions for successful collaborations between experimental economists and political 
decision-makers. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decades, the importance of experiments in economic science has been 
steadily increasing and collaborations between experimental economists and policy 
makers are now established in a wide range of domains. Collaborating with policy 
makers can be a promising option for experimental researchers, because such 
collaborations offer the possibility to transfer insights from fundamental research to 
applied field problems with potentially substantial societal impact. The increasing 
importance of experiments for policy design is also reflected in the growing number of 
countries that have established (and are in the process of establishing) initiatives with the 
explicit goal of designing and evaluating public policy utilizing insights from behavioral 
economics. The Behavioral Insights Team in the UK founded in 2010 was the first policy 
unit among these institutions; in the Netherlands a Behavioral Policy Network has been 
established in 2014.1 
There are several reasons why the use of experiments can be an added value in the policy 
domain: First, experiments can improve the ex-ante assessment of outcomes of policy 
interventions. Policy measures are chosen to achieve a specific goal, and the nature of 
these measures reflects underlying theories about the mechanisms and channels through 
which this goal may be reached. Experiments can be used to validate these theories and 
also to compare alternative theories under controlled conditions before an intervention is 
implemented. For example, when the task is to design the rules in a specific market, 
                                                          
1 The UNEP report on “Behavioural insights applied to policy” (Lourenço et al. 2016) gives an overview of 
European initiatives in this area. For an extensive list of recent interventions based on behavioral 
regularities please see the recent OECD report “Behavioural insights and public policy - Lessons from 
around the world” (OECD 2017). 
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experiments can serve as “testbeds” to compare the outcomes of alternative market 
institutions and therefore help to choose the option that fits the policy goal best.  
Moreover, experimental techniques can improve the ex-post evaluation of policy 
measures. If a policy intervention is implemented in the field under a rigorous 
experimental protocol, observed changes in behavior among the target population can be 
unambiguously attributed to this intervention. A crucial feature of experiments is that 
they are based on the random assignment of persons into groups who are subject to 
variations in the experimental conditions (“treatments”) and a control group that serves as 
the reference condition. The comparison between the outcomes of interest in treatment 
groups and the control group avoids confounds due to selection problems present in non-
experimental datasets (see, for example, Angrist and Pischke 2008 for a discussion of the 
value of random assignments). Experiments thus can establish causal effects between a 
policy measure and the related output variables and thereby add substantial precision to 
the ex-post evaluation of policy interventions. 
Traditionally, economic policy measures have been designed from a neoclassical 
perspective based on the assumption that citizens are strictly rational (Chetty 2015). Yet 
experimental research both from the laboratory and the field has demonstrated that 
economic decision-makers are often only boundedly rational (Kahneman 2003) and 
exhibit other-regarding preferences such as concerns for fairness and reciprocity (Cooper 
and Kagel 2016). Also, people are found to be widely heterogeneous with respect to 
social preferences and other personal characteristics such as the attitude towards risk (see, 
for example, Bellemare et al. 2008, Dohmen et al. 2009, Dohmen et al. 2011, Falk et al. 
forthcoming). In this sense, fundamental research in experimental economics has 
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provided important insights into the nature of decision-making that can be utilized for the 
proper design of policy interventions. 
The discrepancy between the assumption of full rationality and empirically relevant 
behavioral patterns might in many cases lead to significantly different assessments of the 
anticipated success of particular policy measures. Moreover, the inclusion of behavioral 
regularities in the decision process of politicians may lead to the emergence of new 
policies that are not identified by a neo-classical perspective, simply because the policy 
parameters would be decision-irrelevant if economic agents indeed would maximize their 
monetary utility (Madrian 2014, Chetty 2015).  
In this paper, we provide a deliberately selective overview of diverse experimental 
methods in economics that can support political decision-making, covering both 
laboratory and field experiments. The advantages and caveats of these two kinds of 
experiments have been discussed extensively in the literature (see, for example, Harrison 
and List 2004, Levitt and List 2007, Falk and Heckman 2009, Levitt and List 2009, 
Croson and Gächter 2010). As we focus on the general role of experiments for policy 
design and evaluation, we will not compare the relative merits of each approach in this 
paper. From a policy as well as scientific perspective, both approaches should in our view 
be seen as complementary tools and be combined where necessary and possible.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we will review 
selected cases where experimental studies have created important insights for policy 
design. For the sake of brevity, we will concentrate on selected topics from the areas of 
environmental policy and tax policy. Of course, experiments have yielded important 
policy-relevant insights in many other areas (in the fields of health policy and the 
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regulation of retirement savings, to name just two). Also, as the scope of this paper does 
not allow us to discuss a larger number of thematically related studies, we will focus on 
exemplary papers with the goal to demonstrate the diversity of experimental approaches 
that can be applied in the policy domain. In the third and final section of this paper, we 
discuss some important factors that we believe will shape the collaboration between 
experimental economists and policy makers in the future. 
 
2. Experiments and policy design - Applications 
Environmental policy 
Environmental protection is one of the most pressing problems for humanity. At the same 
time, its inherent social dilemma character makes it very difficult to mitigate the 
extensive exploitation of natural resources. Hence, a crucial question for policy makers in 
this context is how to induce stronger cooperation in the context of environmental 
protection. For instance, international cooperation in the context of the abatement of 
carbon dioxide emissions is seen as a key prerequisite to fight climate change (Cooper et 
al. 2016). Obviously, the climate change problem has many facets and involves activity 
on both collective and individual level, from negotiation between state governments to 
individual consumption decisions. In the following, we will give an overview of some 
dimensions of the climate change problem where experiments have provided important 
insights to support policy design.  
First, targeted at private consumers, a growing number of field experiments test the 
impact of interventions designed to lower resource usage, often in cooperation with 
utilities (for example, Price 2014, Hahn and Metcalfe 2016, Brent et al. 2017 provide 
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extensive surveys in which they review many of the studies described here in more 
detail). A particular advantage of this approach is that experiments are conducted on a 
large scale and with “real” customers, allowing for direct inferences on the effectiveness 
of an intervention with the targeted population. The efficient use of energy is a 
cognitively challenging task and involves trading off short-term versus long-term benefits 
and costs, and it is unlikely that all consumers are able to perform the necessary 
calculations and to arrive at an individually optimal result. Moreover, incomplete 
information or inattention to the relevant decision parameters can substantially distort 
decisions. 
In the context of energy use, various field experiments focus on customers’ responses to 
the introduction of dynamic pricing schemes. The goal of these schemes is to reduce 
electricity usage of the targeted customers in phases of peak demand by significant price 
increases during these periods. Standard economic reasoning would suggest that 
households adjust electricity use when facing higher prices. Yet, while the field evidence 
suggests that consumers do react to price shifts (see the surveys mentioned above for a 
summary of the evidence), the price elasticity of demand is on average smaller than 
expected and estimates vary greatly between the studies. This suggests that households 
might not react to price changes in a fully rational way or that they might lack the 
required information to adjust their energy consumption. 
Indeed, non-market instruments explicitly targeted at potential information frictions 
induce significant shifts in energy conservation. For example, Jessoe and Rapson (2014) 
observe in a large field experiment that households indeed reduce energy consumption in 
response to significant price shifts, but to a significantly stronger extent if they have 
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adequate knowledge about their real-time consumption which is ensured by the provision 
of “in-home displays” allowing the treated households to track their energy consumption 
and electricity prices in real time. Moreover, Tiefenbeck et al. (2017) show in a sample of 
Swiss households that the availability of devices that provide real-time information about 
energy and water consumption while showering substantially reduces energy 
consumption and increases awareness about resource usage. At the same time, Allcott and 
Taubinsky (2015) test the importance of information provision about the cost savings 
potential of energy-efficient lightbulbs in an experiment on a survey platform with a 
representative population sample and in a natural field experiment and find only a 
moderate increase in the willingness to pay and no significant demand effect in the field. 
This finding suggests that inattention and lack of information alone cannot explain energy 
overconsumption. 
Other field experiments have established an important impact of the provision of social 
information to customers, explicitly addressing non-standard preferences. One potential 
channel through which social information might change resource usage is through social 
norms. The underlying hypothesis is that communicating norm-relevant information to 
households might shift behavior into the direction of the norm due to a preference for 
norm conformity.  
The importance of norms for electricity consumption is demonstrated by a field study 
conducted by Allcott (2011), drawing on a sample of 600,000 households in the United 
States. In a series of field experiments conducted in collaboration with local utilities, a 
random sample of households receives home energy reports from the company OPOWER 
containing comparison information about the electricity usage of neighbors. This 
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treatment is highly effective in achieving reductions of energy usage: Treated households 
reduce energy consumption by about 2% on average, with the largest effects found for 
households with high pre-treatment usage.2 Also, Ferraro and Price (2013) consider the 
effects of one-time mailings including appeals to water conservation and find that appeals 
including social comparison information are especially effective in inducing lower water 
consumption although the general effect of appeals is getting weaker in the months after 
the intervention. Similarly, Allcott and Rogers (2014) observe a “backsliding” effect in 
the sense that households who receive OPOWER reports initially reduce energy 
consumption but this reduction is mitigated during the time period when no report is 
received. However, this backsliding effect becomes smaller with repeated receipts of the 
reports. Moreover, even in a group of households for which the intervention was stopped 
after two years, positive effects of the reports are found in the subsequent years, 
suggesting that the provision of energy reports including social information can have 
lasting behavioral impacts through habit formation. 
The results of these studies are very appealing from a policy perspective, because they 
suggest that simple and cheap interventions can have noticeable effects on behavior. For 
example, Allcott (2011) estimates that the effect of the social comparison intervention on 
energy reduction is equivalent to the effect of an increase in the short-term energy price 
of about 10 - 20 %.  
At the same time, customer responses to policy interventions might be very 
heterogeneous. For example, Costa and Kahn (2014) find that energy reports are much 
                                                          
2 The treatment also included additional norm information (conveyed through emoticons related 
to the relative standing towards the peer group), but this information does not drive the main 
treatment effects. 
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more effective in inducing energy savings among political liberals than among 
conservatives. This and other findings (also in the studies described above) imply that 
there is a risk that information interventions might be ineffective for substantial shares of 
the targeted population due to the nature of the underlying preferences of these groups. 
Hence, when designing an intervention, policy makers have to gain more precise insights 
into the preference structure of the target population in order to tailor the details of the 
intervention to these preferences. 
One effective way of generating such insights is the use of so-called “lab-in-the-field” 
experiments. Lab-in-the field experiments, defined by Gneezy and Imas (2017) as studies 
that are “conducted in a naturalistic environment targeting the theoretically relevant 
population but using a standardized, validated lab paradigm” enable researchers (and 
policy makers) to gain an understanding about the degree and nature of non-standard 
preferences among the target population.3 
To gain a better understanding of behavioral factors relevant for the extraction of natural 
resources, several studies collect information about non-standard preferences on the 
individual level and link this to behavior in the field. For example, Rustagi et al. (2010) 
conduct lab-in the field experiments among forest user groups in Ethiopia who jointly 
manage the extraction of the resources from their forests. For individual forest users, the 
authors measure the inclination towards conditional cooperation (i.e. the willingness to 
cooperate if others also cooperate) and find that a higher share of conditional cooperators 
in a group is associated with more successful forest management. Moreover, additionally 
                                                          
3 Gneezy and Imas (2017) and Viceisza (2016) provide detailed surveys about lab-in-the-field 
experiments. 
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collected survey data reveals that these individuals also engage in more extensive 
monitoring activities and thereby enforce higher cooperation by other members of their 
groups.  
Similarly, Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) link measures for cooperativeness and time 
preferences of Brazilian fishermen with resource extraction in the field. They find that 
fishermen who are more cooperative and more patient in the experiment show less 
exploitative behavior in the field, as they use more sustainable fishing techniques. Riedl 
and Smeets (2017) show that such a relationship between preferences measured in a 
laboratory-like environment and field behavior not only holds for forest management and 
fishermen but extends to high stakes financial decisions. They find that social preferences 
measured in an Internet experiment using a trust game are predictive for the likelihood 
that private investors hold socially responsible mutual funds in their portfolio. 
Several studies also investigate how the institutional and natural surroundings shape 
cooperativeness in the context of resource extraction. For instance, Gneezy et al. (2016) 
provide evidence that the working environment has a crucial impact on cooperativeness: 
A group of Brazilian fishermen who fish at sea and are forced to work in groups exhibit 
substantially higher cooperativeness in a range of experimental games than fishermen 
from a comparable society where fishermen work individually.  
Experiments like the described studies allow for a deeper understanding of the 
distribution of preferences within a given population. In particular, as Gneezy and Imas 
(2016) point out, lab-in-the-field studies can yield important complementary insights for 
large scale field interventions and randomized control trials. Lab-in-the-field studies also 
allow politicians to gain understanding of the underlying motivations behind behavioral 
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patterns and to assess the prospects of success for policies that have the goal to trigger 
particular behavioral responses among citizens.  
The research described above focuses on individual decision-makers. Other studies 
related to environmental policy address the role of the institutional environment. This line 
of research is devoted to the organization of market processes to internalize the 
externalities arising from the extraction of resources (see, for example, Sturm and 
Weimann 2006, Cason 2010, Friesen and Gangadharan 2013 and Noussair and van Soest 
2014 for extensive surveys of the literature).  
A prominent example where experiments have contributed to policy making in this area 
is the design of market institutions for the trading of emission permits, while recent 
studies also explore the trading of water and auctions with the goal to buy land for 
conservation purposes (see Friesen and Gangadharan 2013 for a comprehensive overview 
of this research). Within the last decades, large-scale markets for emission permits have 
been implemented in many countries including the US and notably the European Union 
with its large Emission Trading System (EU-ETS), with the goal to efficiently allocate 
pollution rights to emitters.  
The rules and structure of these markets are typically very complex and it is often 
difficult to assess theoretically how adjustments in the market rules may affect the 
incentives for market participants and the resulting outcomes. Because field experiments 
are typically not possible and because failures in the design of large scale markets can 
lead to large economic losses and inefficiencies, here laboratory experiments can be an 
important tool in successful market design. Experimental studies in this area are often 
directed towards the inherent questions and problems of very specific markets. These 
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studies test predictions about market outcomes with human traders under tightly 
controlled conditions, enabling researchers to assess whether behavior converges to 
theoretical predictions and also to observe behavioral regularities that are not predicted 
by theory. Moreover, in cases where economic theory does not provide clear hypotheses, 
experiments have an important function as “testbeds” in order to evaluate the advantages 
and disadvantages of alternative market designs.  
Given the large variety of auction designs and market parameters that these studies 
address, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a broad overview of the literature. 
Instead, we focus on outlining a few topics that have been in the focus of the 
experimental work on the design of emissions markets. First, seminal studies have 
focused on the role of the pricing rule in auctions for emissions rights. For example, 
Cason (1995) and Cason and Plott (1996) study the impact of the rules of an auction 
organized by the US Environmental Protection Agency to trade emission allowances and 
show how details in the pricing mechanism can substantially distort the auction 
outcomes. In this auction, bidders are matched to sellers according to bid prices, but with 
the specific feature that sellers who have posted the lowest asking price receive the 
highest bids. This rule creates undesired effects, as it becomes optimal for sellers to ask 
for a lower price than their true cost of abatement. Cason (1995) confirms this pattern in 
an experiment that covers only one market side (incentives are reversed in this design so 
that participants act as buyers who should overbid relative to their valuation). Cason and 
Plott (1996) test this auction design comparing a discriminatory pricing rule (every bidder 
pays the price according to his individual bid) to a uniform pricing rule (all bidders pay 
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the same price) and find that the latter achieves higher efficiency and leads to more 
truthful revelation of valuations and costs.  
Another group of studies focuses on the impact of market rules concerning the expiration 
of emission certificates. For instance, Cason and Gangadharan (2006) test what the 
permission of “banking” - that is, the ability of emitters to keep unused certificates for 
future periods - has on price dynamics in these markets. Uncertainty for producers is 
implemented through random shocks to their planned abatement levels. The authors 
observe that banking reduces price variability, in particular after the realization of 
abatement shocks. At the same time, banking leads to lower compliance, suggesting that 
producers distort their reported abatement levels downwards in order to save certificates 
for later periods, which eventually leads to higher emissions. 
As a final example, we emphasize studies that analyze the role the initial allocation of 
emission permits has for later market outcomes. In field emissions markets, certificates 
either have been assigned to the producers at no cost on the basis of historical emissions 
(“grandfathering”) or have been auctioned off. Theoretically, if producers can trade 
certificates after the allocation on a spot market, the initial allocation procedure should 
not matter for final outcomes. However, experiments show that behavior of bidders as 
well as market outcomes seem to respond to the initial allocation mechanism: For 
example, Goeree et al. (2010) find that in a treatment with grandfathering high emission 
producers exercise market power in the spot market and certificate prices increase above 
the competitive level. Moreover, as spot markets cannot fully correct the initial 
misallocations of certificates, low emission producers end up with too few certificates, in 
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particular in the grandfathering treatment, which lowers supply and decreases consumer 
welfare in a subsequent production stage. 
Studies like the ones presented, but also more generally studies that test market designs 
often differ from “typical” laboratory experiments in important ways. In particular, such 
studies are often motivated by specific problems of the markets in question and are often 
aimed at directly informing policy makers about the impact of a-priori given alternative 
market institutions. Consequently, the experimental decision situation should resemble 
the relevant features of the particular market as closely as possible. Such studies, while 
being informative for the specific policy question, often have the downside of reduced 
generalizability.  
 
Tax Policy 
Given that taxes are the main source of income of the government, it is of vital 
importance to understand behavioral responses of citizens to the intended incentives of 
the existing tax system and to assess which interventions may increase tax revenues and 
compliance. Substantial experimental work has been conducted in two areas: The first 
group of studies focuses on tax evasion and investigates responses either to changes in 
the sanctioning mechanism or to interventions that aim at triggering the intrinsic 
motivation of citizens to pay taxes (Luttmer and Singhal 2014 provide an extensive 
survey). The second group of studies starts from the idea that citizens might not respond 
in a strictly rational way to the incentives set by a particular tax and tests if and how 
changes in the information or the presentation of taxes affect decisions. 
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Tax evasion is a widespread problem which Alm (2012, p.55) defines as “illegal and 
intentional actions taken by individuals to reduce their legally due tax obligations”. The 
standard economic approach to model the individual decision to evade taxes has been 
introduced by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In their model, a rational taxpayer has to 
choose whether to report his true income or a smaller amount. Given the likelihood of tax 
audits and the potential fines imposed when caught, the decision-maker evaluates 
expected costs and benefits of underreporting taxable income. Allingham and Sandmo 
show that both an increase in the audit probability and the penalty after being detected 
lead to a higher reported income.  
If the policy goal is to reduce tax evasion, it is necessary to assess the behavioral effects 
of policies aimed at increasing the likelihood of detecting tax evasion, as well as a 
thorough understanding of potential additional factors that drive compliance. Yet given 
the illegal nature of tax evasion, taxpayers have the obvious incentive to disguise their 
actions as much as possible, which makes it extremely hard to track individual evasion 
using field data - caught tax evaders, for which data are available, potentially represent 
only a small share of the actual cases. Here, the experimental approach has a substantial 
advantage over observational field data analysis, among other things because experiments 
can uncover the underlying mechanisms behind tax evasion and also enable researchers 
to test behavioral responses to changes in parameters of a tax regime. 
Many early laboratory investigations related to tax policy have focused on the effect of 
audit probability and fines on the decision to evade taxes (Blackwell 2007, Alm and 
Jacobson 2007 and Alm 2012 review the literature) and generally found that these factors 
are positively correlated with tax compliance. Moreover, evidence from field experiments 
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suggest that the fear of being detected has a significant impact on individual decisions. 
For example, Kleven et al. (2011) conduct a large field experiment with a random sample 
of more than 40,000 Danish taxpayers. In the first part of this study, a group of taxpayers 
is randomly selected and subject to an audit process. The authors find evidence for 
substantial underreporting of self-reported income. In a second intervention conducted in 
the subsequent year, letters are sent out to different groups of taxpayers announcing 
different probabilities with which their tax statements will be audited. The authors 
observe that the threat of an audit increases self-reported income (with stronger effects 
when the audit is conducted with certainty). Notably, these effects are weaker than the 
effect of an actual experience of an audit in the previous year. A similar effect is found in 
the field experiment by Fellner et al. (2013) who analyze the impact of mailings to 
potential evaders of TV license fees and find among other things that receiving a letter 
significantly increases the probability of registering for the fee, and that this probability 
increases further if the mailing includes the threat of an audit.  
These observations are important for policy design as they increase the confidence in the 
general effectiveness of measures to improve tax compliance under the assumption of 
rational taxpayers.  
At the same time, in their survey article Luttmer and Singhal (2014) emphasize the 
importance of intrinsic motivation among citizens (“tax morale”) to comply with tax 
obligations. For example, Dwenger et al. (2016) conduct a field experiment in which the 
authors exploit the fact that the local church tax in the German federal state of Bavaria is 
not enforced. In a baseline treatment with no intervention, the authors find that despite 
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the lack of enforcement, a substantial share of taxpayers (more than 20%) indeed fulfill 
their church tax liability.4  
This result opens up the possibility for policy makers to potentially induce higher tax 
compliance in the field by choosing adequate appeals to taxpayers, in order to leverage 
citizens’ intrinsic motivation for compliance. Due to the low costs of implementation 
(especially compared to the costs of more extensive tax audits), an intervention targeting 
non-standard preferences appears very attractive, but at the same time, the design of such 
an intervention requires a thorough understanding of the underlying psychological 
mechanisms that drive tax compliance. Similar to the examples from energy policy, one 
potential mechanism is adherence to social norms. If norm conformity plays a role for tax 
compliance, approaching taxpayers with norm-relevant information might induce less 
evasion. Several field experiments have put this idea into practice, but the evidence so far 
is mixed. Among these studies, for instance, Bott et al. (2017) find that moral appeals 
have a significant positive effect on declared income from abroad. Moreover, moral 
appeals seem to be effective predominantly on the intensive margin, i.e. they induce 
higher payments from taxpayers who already declare some income. At the same time, the 
moral suasion intervention appears not to have a lasting effect as it does not influence 
declared income one year later.  
Hallsworth et al. (2017) test a variety of messages that, for example, trigger different 
aspects of norms in a sample of more than 200,000 taxpayers in the United Kingdom and 
establish a positive effect of social norms messages on the timely payment of taxes. 
Moreover, the field experiment by Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2015) shows that an 
                                                          
4 In the context of this particular church tax, citizens can even decide to pay more than their tax 
liability which is considered as a donation to the local church. 
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intervention that makes the tax delinquency of a person more salient to households who 
live nearby increases the probability of repaying taxes, but only if tax debts are small. 
Relatedly, Casal and Mittone (2016) find in a laboratory context that negative sanctions 
(showing photos of tax evaders) significantly increases compliance. 
At the same time, there are examples in the literature where interventions related to 
payment norms were not successful. In the study by Fellner et al. (2013) described above, 
neither the information about the descriptive norm (the share of citizens who actually pay 
the tax) or a moral appeal highlighting the fairness aspect of paying the tax has a 
significant additional positive impact on compliance. Also, in a set of treatments 
conducted by Dwenger et al. (2016), announcing rewards for compliance (the possibility 
of public recognition or a monetary price) has a counterproductive effect as this reduces 
the probability of paying among previous tax evaders. In a laboratory setting, Lefebvre et 
al. (2015) show that norm conformity might backfire from a tax authority perspective: 
When participants receive information about evasive patterns in previous experimental 
sessions, evasion rates do not respond to information on high compliance, but increase in 
response to information on low compliance.  
All in all, the literature leads to ambiguous conclusions about the impact of interventions 
that appeal to a preference for norm conformity. This ambiguity is important information 
for policy design as it shows that some policy instruments may only work in specific 
circumstances. 
A second area in which experiments offer important insights is related to the perception 
of tax incentives. Overall, experimental studies from both the laboratory and the field 
suggest that the perception of taxes is substantially distorted (Fochmann et al. 2010 
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survey the earlier evidence), even in stylized settings where the incentives induced by the 
taxes are relatively easy to understand. The potential impact of distorted tax perceptions 
might be severe given that most actual tax systems are highly complex and non-linear.  
First, there is abundant evidence for distortions in the understanding and evaluation of tax 
incentives. In addition, the way a tax is presented is also found to significantly affect 
behavior. For example, in a field experiment conducted in a grocery store, Chetty et al. 
(2009) find that increasing the saliency of a sales tax by incorporating it into the price 
tags significantly decreases the purchased quantities of the treated items. Blaufus et al. 
(2013) provide evidence from conjoint analysis and a laboratory study that the majority 
of experimental subjects, when being confronted with different menus of taxes, are 
unable to pick the menu of tax rate and tax base that would minimize their tax burden. 
Instead, decision-makers seem to rely on decision heuristics and overrate changes in the 
tax rates relative to changes in the tax base.  
Second, an important related question is whether taxpayers are adjusting their labor 
supply to changes in the taxation of labor income which, as a result of various deductions 
possibilities relating to the personal situation of the taxpayer, might be rather challenging 
to understand. Since it is not possible in the field to vary taxes systematically for different 
groups of citizens, laboratory experiments can help to find answers to this question. In a 
real-effort experiment, Abeler and Jäger (2015) let subjects work under a simple and a 
complex tax regime that induce the same optimal output. The authors find that under the 
complex tax system, the probability that a subject chooses a suboptimal output level is 
higher. In addition, subjects who face the complex tax regime show weaker behavioral 
adjustments to the introduction of a new tax. Similarly, Blumkin et al. (2012) reject the 
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hypothesis that consumption and income taxes are behaviorally equivalent in a real effort 
experiment: When being confronted with a tax on labor income, subjects reduce their 
working time significantly stronger than subjects who have to pay an equivalent 
consumption tax. 
The results obtained by Weber and Schram (2017) indicate that even the perception of 
which party legally pays a labor tax (employer or employee) can significantly affect 
subjects’ responses. Although it should be irrelevant from a rational perspective which 
party legally pays the tax, employees express higher satisfaction levels and a preference 
for a larger public sector when the tax is levied at the employer’s side, the latter being 
consistent with the interpretation that paying the tax themselves is perceived as a loss by 
employees. This violation of the liability side equivalence (LSE) of taxes (and subsides) 
has also been found by Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000). In these studies taxes are 
imposed in respectively a multilateral and bilateral setting without markets. Other studies 
have explored LSE in competitive market settings and do not find a violation of LSE 
(Kachelmeier et al. 1994, Borck et al. 2002, Riedl and Tyran 2005, Ruffle 2005). This 
suggests that misperception of the legal and economic incidence of taxes plays a role in 
non-market settings but is absent or at least mitigated when taxes are imposed in 
competitive markets.  
Besides the potential misperception of tax incentives, there is also evidence that the 
existence of taxes per se leads to additional distortions: In a real-effort experiment 
conducted with a non-student sample, Fochmann and Weimann (2013) find that subjects 
work significantly longer when their income is taxed compared to the case of an identical 
net wage without taxation. In a laboratory setting, Kessler and Norton (2016) report that 
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participants reduce working time significantly more in a real-effort task when lower 
remuneration is explicitly framed as a tax rather than as a wage reduction. Moreover, in a 
study that investigates how preferences for redistribution respond to different framings, 
Lorenz et al. (2017) find that participants choose substantially more redistribution when it 
is framed as a minimal income rather than as a tax. 
All in all, the results of these studies clearly highlight that non-standard preferences may 
have a substantial impact on the willingness to fulfill tax obligations. Moreover, taxes 
which are equivalent from a rational perspective might induce non-trivial differences in 
behavior due to variations in their saliency and complexity. At the same time, the diverse 
findings in the literature so far do not allow for a systematic evaluation of the robustness 
and the relative importance of the documented observations. 
One implication of the existing research is that due to the potential heterogeneity of 
taxpayers, simple interventions might not yield the desired outcomes. For example, 
Chetty and Saez (2013) show in a large field experiment that an information intervention 
that explains tax incentives to clients who receive earned income tax credits in the United 
States does not have a significant average effect on earnings in the subsequent year. Also, 
the mixed success of interventions highlighting norm-relevant information suggests that 
more emphasis should be put on exploring the heterogeneity of taxpayers. A recent field 
experiment by Boyer et al. (2016) moves into this direction: Similar to the study by 
Dwenger et al. (2016) discussed above, the study exploits the fact that a local church tax 
is not enforced. The authors send out different appeals to taxpayers that highlight the 
character of the tax either as legal obligation, voluntary payment or charitable donation 
and find that the responses to these appeals are substantially different between groups of 
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citizens who vary in their intrinsic motivation to pay the tax. Finally, only a few studies 
exist that compare behavioral responses from students to those of non-students. As these 
studies do not arrive at unambiguous conclusions (see, for example, Alm et al. 2015, 
Choo et al. 2016), more studies are required in order to determine to what extent the 
conclusions derived from laboratory settings with student participants are transferable to 
more representative samples.  
 
3. Further directions of how experimental economists and political decision- 
makers can collaborate  
The variety of the different experimental approaches reviewed in this paper demonstrates 
that the range of potential applications of experiments is large: First, studies conducted in 
the economic laboratory provide insights into fundamental behavioral responses to 
elements of policy interventions and serve as testbeds for alternative market institutions 
in the field. A good example for the latter application is the design of market institutions 
in the context of emission permits described above where actually existing institutions are 
analyzed with tools from economic theory and experiments with the goal of removing 
design flaws and improving market performance. As more and more market interactions 
are organized in a centralized and computerized way, we expect the importance of 
experiments providing “wind tunnel” tests for institutional rules to continue to be high 
(see also, for example, Roth 2002 for a description of the role of experiments in 
providing empirical evidence for market design, and Bolton and Ockenfels 2012 for an 
overview on the economic engineering of markets and institutions based on behavioral 
research).  
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Second, large-scale field experiments have established policy interventions based on 
research in behavioral economics and psychology as a powerful and cost-effective tool to 
influence behavior. Furthermore, a proper field study enables politicians to test the 
effectiveness of one or more interventions directly with the target population. More 
generally, guided by the prominence and success of large-scale field interventions in 
policy-relevant areas (Banerjee and Duflo 2016) we expect that the number of controlled 
field experiments will continue to grow, often to test the role of the exact details in the 
implementation that may be pivotal for the success or failure of policy measures (Duflo 
2017). 
From a researcher’s perspective, a challenge for the collaboration between researchers 
and practitioners is the possible difference in objectives. From a scientific perspective, 
experimental research designs have to be as abstract as possible in order to remove 
potential confounds and to isolate the mechanisms underlying the results as cleanly as 
possible. Such experiments are likely too abstract and too general to be directly 
applicable to specific policy questions. However, some of the generated insights may still 
be policy-relevant: For example, experimentally detected violations of basic theoretical 
principles might caution policy makers about the limits of the theories on which they base 
decisions.  
At the same time, experimental research designs that target specific policy design issues 
often have to include many details and specific content in order to be applicable to the 
policy issue in question. For example, experiments testing market designs (as discussed 
in the last section) or complicated economy-wide tax reforms (as in Riedl and van 
Winden 2007, 2012) tend to be more complex than typical laboratory studies. From a 
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practitioners’ perspective it might be desirable to use experimental methods for targeted 
studies with a very narrow policy scope. Such studies might yield important insights that 
can be directly transferred to the field, but the generalizability of such insights would be 
limited (and potentially less of a concern from a practitioners’ perspective).  
Furthermore, there might be practical barriers for collaborations between experimental 
researchers and practitioners, in particular concerning the implementation of field 
interventions. Difficulties for practitioners to accept this method may arise from 
reservations against randomization (i.e. the fact that groups of individuals are randomly 
selected and treated while other groups do not receive the same treatment) or from 
concerns about legal issues including the active consent of individuals to participate in a 
field intervention. These concerns have to be weighted against the advantages that the 
random assignment of participants to treatments offer for the evaluation of policy 
measures (please see the introduction of this paper). Practitioners may also be concerned 
with the timing of experimental research due to the political cycle. While scientific 
scrutiny may require substantial time for the setup of the experimental design, 
practitioners may be more interested in a quick implementation.  
One aspect that in our view has not always received sufficient attention is the long-term 
implementation of policy measures. In particular, in the context of large-scale field 
interventions, researchers should be involved in the long-term evaluation and the 
monitoring of the dynamic effects of one-time policy changes. A good example for the 
focus on the long-term performance of a policy intervention is the study by Allcott and 
Rogers (2014) who observe that repeated energy reports might help customers to develop 
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habits of lower energy consumption that create persistent energy savings even after the 
intervention has been stopped. 
Moreover, heterogeneous responses are an important concern for the design of policy 
measures. If different citizen groups adjust their behaviors to an intervention in different 
ways, this might strongly mitigate the overall effect of a policy intervention. For 
example, heterogeneous responses might contribute to the explanation why appeals to 
non-standard preferences may not always induce higher tax compliance (see for example, 
the studies by Boyer et al. 2016 and Dwenger at al. 2016 who observe that the response 
to interventions depend on the characteristics of the particular taxpayers, and Costa and 
Kahn 2014 in the context of energy reports). Consequently, when citizens’ preferences 
vary widely it may be unclear which kind of intervention will have the strongest 
behavioral impact. This calls for more research into the heterogeneity of preferences and 
how these are related to behavioral responses to policy interventions. Also, the exact 
behavioral mechanisms that may lead to specific responses to the interventions are often 
ambiguous. Hence, the design of interventions will typically have to incorporate multiple 
potential channels through which the chosen policy may affect behavior. To specify the 
exact design details and to avoid ambiguities as much as possible, ideally interventions 
should be based on theoretical hypotheses (see Card et al. 2011 for the value of theory for 
field experiments). 
As policy interventions are often conducted in very specific domains, a natural question 
is to what extent results from these domains can be transferred to other settings. Given 
the complexity of field settings and the multiplicity of influence factors that may cause 
success or failure of a policy intervention, it is far from clear whether a measure that has 
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created positive effects in a certain application will have similar positive effects in 
another (similar) application. To assess the robustness and generalizability of particular 
policy measures to other domains, the successful implementation of an intervention 
should be replicated in similar environments and also in other policy areas. Such 
replications would be relevant both from a research and a policy perspective. This aspect 
connects to the more general issue of replication that is now prominently discussed in 
respect to laboratory experiments (see Camerer at al. 2016 and the references cited 
therein) but applies to all experimental (and non-experimental) methods. In many cases, 
replication might be problematic in the context of field experiments, as the exact 
conditions of the original study likely will be very difficult or impossible to replicate. 
This also holds for experiments with a focus on a very specific and narrow question of 
particular interest for practitioners. However, as some field interventions consist of very 
simple manipulations (for example, mailings that appeal to social preferences), the 
replication of the nature of these interventions in a related context should be in principle 
possible. 
Relatedly, an important input for the design of effective policies is transparent 
information about experiments and interventions that have not induced the expected 
behavioral changes. This requires that experiments with null (or even negative) results are 
reported to a broad audience of scientists and political decision-makers. An example for 
the transparent communication of a null result is the study by Kettle et al. (2017) who 
conducted a large–scale field experiment with citizens from Guatemala who declare their 
taxes online. Before entering their tax filings, participants are presented information that 
should trigger different non-standard motivations to pay taxes, such as preferences for 
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honesty or the willingness to contribute to public goods. Yet, none of the interventions led 
to a significant increase in the declared tax. The authors attribute this finding among other 
things to the specific online setting in which the experiment was conducted and the self-
selected sample of participants (individuals who made the active decision to declare their 
taxes and thus might not be affected by an intervention that aims at improving honesty). 
This highlights the fact that small details in the setup of a behavioral intervention can 
have a crucial impact on its effectiveness. 
Studies in the laboratory enable researchers to isolate mechanisms that may drive patterns 
in the field but cannot be tracked there, and provide insights that can be used for the 
redesign of institutions in the field in turn. However, relatively few studies have exploited 
the advantages of different experimental methods in a complementary way. An optimal 
policy design cycle would comprise the complementary use of different experimental 
methods. It would start with a laboratory experiment to investigate the nature of 
preferences among human decision-makers that are relevant for the policy-relevant 
decision situation in the field. In case the existing experimental research already provides 
robust evidence on non-standard preferences, this first step might not always be 
necessary. The next step would be to conduct a lab-in-the-field study to gain thorough 
insights into whether the target group of a planned policy intervention has similar 
preferences and shows similar behavioral patterns as the laboratory population. Finally, a 
field experiment could be implemented to test behavioral responses of the target 
population to interventions designed on the basis of the insights into their preferences 
from the lab-in-the-field study.  
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In practice, however, such an approach may be difficult to implement due to financial and 
time constraints. A potential downside in that respect is that due to these limitations some 
interventions that are designed on the basis of less detailed knowledge about the 
preferences of the target population may be less successful than expected, which may 
have a negative effect on the perceived effectiveness of experiments for policy design in 
general. At the same time, the approach to use multiple experimental methods in a 
complementary way is in principle applicable to a wide area of policy-relevant problems 
and can provide important knowledge for the exact specification of policy measures. In 
particular, this approach enables targeted policies, i.e. policies designed for specific 
subgroups of the population that take the heterogeneity of preferences and decision-
makers explicitly into account. 
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